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The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 were a devastating shock to the United 
States. They alerted Americans to the new threat of non-state actors. National Security had been 
severely damaged, and the new threat provoked the U.S. to enter into a problematic war in the 
Middle East region.   
Immediately after the attacks, the “blame game” began. Though there are seventeen 
organizations in the United States intelligence community, the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) suffered the worst criticism for their roles in 
failing to prevent the attacks. The Bush administration established the 9/11 Commission in order 
to investigate what went wrong and to determine how to fix it. Based on the recommendations 
provided by the Commission, various organizations were changed and/or created in the 
intelligence community. Out of many changes, two were the most significant. The Director of 
National Intelligence, who became the head of the entire intelligence community, both foreign 
and domestic, was created. Another major change was the creation of a cabinet-level Department 
dedicated to Homeland Security. There has been an ongoing debate since the 9/11 Commission’s 
report about whether the changes to the intelligence community were truly beneficial or if they 
were in fact counterproductive. Many people argue that the recommendations were not enough 
and that there are more internal issues that need to be addressed in order to truly change the 
intelligence process.  
Intelligence reform is the legislation implemented by the federal government that’s 
purpose is to improve the effectiveness and success of the intelligence community. It would 
seem evident that intelligence reform has failed, but the more important questions lie in where it 
has failed and how to fix it. In this thesis, it will be argued that reform attempts have failed by 
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focusing on surface problems rather than addressing their sources. Future reforms should focus 
on the relationship dynamic between the intelligence community and the policymakers it serves. 
There has been extensive literature published on the problems in the intelligence 
community and the flaws in the reform legislation. Scholars, generally, address the intelligence 
community issues according to the two major themes of internal organizational problems and 
inter-organizational relationships, although, there are many other scholars who critique 
additional aspects of the intelligence community. This literature is mostly in response to the most 
recent reform legislation, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) which was 
instituted as a result of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission report.  
Internal Organizational Problems 
The CIA is the most widely recognized agency in the intelligence community, and with 
that popularity comes a lot of criticism. Robert Baer addresses the decline of the CIA in recent 
years by focusing on the failure of the U.S.to accurately predict Iraq’s Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) capabilities. He suggests how to improve the CIA specifically in order to 
better the intelligence community. Baer claims that the CIA should reform the Directorate of 
Operations (DO), which is in charge of the recruitment of spies; in addition, the promotion 
system should be reformed, and the CIA should be more knowledgeable of source credibility. 
Furthermore, he argues that federal, state, and local databases should be integrated, recruitment 
on college campuses should be reinstituted, the retirement age should be lowered, and the U.S. 
should be less dependent upon foreign governments for intelligence information. His final 
suggestions are for the security clearance system to be altered and for the CIA to begin recruiting 
from the “dark side,” which includes people who may be involved in illicit activities but whose 
connections and knowledge could help the intelligence process (Baer 2005). 
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Thomas Mahnken agrees about changing the clandestine function of the CIA. He argues 
that more attention should be paid to collection of information rather than analysis. He makes the 
point that outside contractors and commercial agencies are able to do the analysis, but only the 
government can do the collection. Mahnken argues that the clandestine function of the CIA 
needs to be refurbished. There should be greater emphasis on spy recruitment, which yields the 
best intelligence. The promotion system of the Clandestine Service needs to be changed so that it 
is based on the quality of information obtained, not the number of spies recruited. Mahnken also 
gives several suggestions for changing the way intelligence analysis is conducted. He thinks the 
current standards are not good enough and that the intelligence community should reevaluate the 
performance of its analysts (Mahnken 2005). 
Apart from the CIA, the other most widely held criticisms are of the position of the 
Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Michael Hayden, former Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (DCIA), addresses one of the biggest issues concerning the DNI position, 
which is his budgetary abilities or rather inabilities. Hayden argues that the DNI has too much 
responsibility and not enough power. The DNI is supposed to be the head of the intelligence 
community, yet the Secretary of Defense still has a lot of power over him. The Secretary of 
Defense not only plays a big role in the budgetary process, but he is also the head of three major 
intelligence organizations (National Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency). He has control over the military intelligence agencies 
and the defense agencies which make up about seven of the total seventeen organizations in the 
intelligence community. The IRTPA legislation was influenced by Donald Rumsfeld, who was 
the Secretary of Defense at the time. He influenced the legislation so that he would not lose any 
power. In order for the position of the DNI to be strengthened, the Secretary of Defense would 
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have to decentralize some of his power. One of the biggest ways for the Secretary of Defense to 
devolve his power would be to allow the DNI to have more budgetary capabilities. The 
budgetary capabilities are essential to the intelligence process because intelligence priorities can 
change in an instant. The head of the intelligence community needs to be able to change 
resources quickly in order to accommodate the emphasis put on new priorities (Hayden 2010). 
Also, Hayden argues that the relationship between the DNI and the DCIA needs to be enhanced 
in order to improve the intelligence community. The relationship tends to have issues because 
the DNI replaced the DCIA as the head of the intelligence community. The culture of the 
intelligence community is still based in history where the DCIA is the boss. Hayden believes the 
DNI and the DCIA should work at different tasks (Hayden 2010). The DNI should set policy and 
give direction, whereas the DCIA should “coordinate, conduct, and operate” (Hayden 2010, 44). 
Derek Reveron is also skeptical of the ability of the DNI because of the authority of the 
Secretary of Defense. His article is an evaluation of John Negroponte’s plan for transforming the 
intelligence community after IRTPA. Reveron argues that analysis needs to be more in depth and 
more accurate for the intelligence community to improve, which is contrary to Thomas 
Mahnken’s point that collection is the most important aspect that needs to be improved. 
Negroponte’s plan included an aspect of coordinating all the intelligence agencies, but Reveron 
does not see this as possible. He thinks the position of the DNI will only be able to coordinate the 
civilian agencies because the Secretary of Defense still holds more power over the military 
agencies. Overall, Reveron seems to agree with most of Negroponte’s ideas for change, but he 
does not believe that they are actually practical.  There would have to be a big change in the 




Helen Fessenden is skeptical of the power of the DNI because of his lack of budgetary 
authority. Though she agrees with Reveron about the limited power of the DNI, it is for different 
reasons.  Fessenden analyzes the IRTPA specifically and provides suggestions for better 
improvements. She attributes the major problems of the intelligence community to the lack of 
inter-organizational cooperation and communication. She argues that the community can be 
improved by giving the DNI more budgetary power, which is also a major point that Michael 
Hayden has argued. They both see the need for DNI budgetary power to be able to foster a 
quicker transition of resources in the event of a new intelligence priority.  Fessenden also makes 
an interesting point about the structure of Congressional budgetary committees. Congress created 
eighty-eight committees and subcommittees responsible for intelligence appropriations. The 
majority of control was given to appropriators, rather than authorizers, even though authorizers 
have more expertise on where the money is needed. The structure of the Congressional 
budgetary committees makes it difficult for the DNI to change budget disbursements and transfer 
funds from one organization to another. As stated previously, this is an important function 
because intelligence priorities change frequently. Fessenden argues that the creation of the 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has been a positive post-9/11 reform because of the 
interagency cooperation it stimulates (Fessenden 2005). 
Nancy Tucker criticizes the DNI, the relationships, and the intelligence process in 
general.  Although she agrees with Fessenden that the position of the DNI is flawed, she states it 
for different reasons. She focuses on changing the culture of the intelligence community as a 
means of changing the effectiveness of it. Though she recognizes changing organizational 
culture can be difficult, she believes it is still possible. She provides seven suggestions for 
changing the intelligence community. First, the relationships between the intelligence 
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community and Congress should be improved. Second, she suggests that there should be a 
National Intelligence University that teaches the fundamentals of intelligence collection and 
analysis without being partial towards one organization. This point has been implemented. There 
has been an intelligence university for the last 50 years, but the school has been renamed many 
times, and just became the “National Intelligence University” last year. Her third point is that 
analysts should employ an evidence-based approach to their work, meaning that they should use 
new analytical tools rather than relying on their past methods for analysis. Fourth, the 
intelligence community should consult experts outside of its realm such as scholars working on 
related topics. Fifth, records should be declassified more rapidly. Sixth, the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence (ODNI) should reassess its staffing problems. Lastly, the ODNI should 
be less dependent on the CIA for its rules and regulations. Tucker uses personal knowledge of 
the inner-workings of the intelligence community as evidence as well as testimony from other 
officials within the community to come to these conclusions (Tucker 2008). 
Mike McConnell agrees with Tucker about the need for a change in the culture. He 
argues that the intelligence community did not reassess after the fall of the Soviet Union. The 
new threats were from non-state actors which require different processes to combat.  He gives 
several suggestions for changing the culture including hiring more diverse people, instituting 
policy that mirrors the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, opening up lines of communication by 
ending the “need to know” policy, and increasing the production of technology used for 
intelligence collection. The evidence used in this article is first-hand because he has experience 
in the field. He does not cite other sources, but uses examples of situations that took place and 
observations he made while working in the intelligence community. This article seems biased 
because it makes no critique of the Office of the DNI which has been cited as one of the 
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important issues concerning post-9/11 reform. The reason for this could be because McConnell 
served as a DNI. He would not want to be critical of his own position in order to preserve job 
security (McConnell 2007). 
Inter-organizational Relationships 
Joshua Rovner and Austin Long argue about the relationships within the government. 
The article is a response to previous work conducted by Amy Zegart. She has written extensively 
on the intelligence community since the Cold War era. Zegart criticizes the intelligence 
community for failing when 9/11 occurred, but Rovner and Long place the blame on 
policymakers. They refute each of Zegart’s arguments about where and how the intelligence 
community failed. In her article, she argues the common reasons for intelligence failure, such as 
turf wars and organizational problems. Rovner and Long, however, cite numerous examples of 
how individual agencies warned policymakers about the threat of Al-Qaeda. Zegart accuses the 
intelligence community of not paying enough attention to terrorist groups, but Rovner and Long 
point out that the CIA had an entire unit devoted to monitoring Osama Bin Laden’s movements 
prior to 9/11 (Rovner and Long 2006). 
Paul Pillar agrees with Rovner and Long in that he also argues that the issues stem from 
the policymakers’ role in the intelligence process. Pillar, who is a former CIA analyst, argues 
that politicization and other issues occur that skew the intelligence disseminated to policymakers 
or the information requested by policymakers. He specifically uses the Iraq WMD case in his 
article to support the argument about the policymakers being flawed in their role in the 
intelligence cycle (Pillar 2006) 
The dissemination step of the intelligence process is also criticized by another scholar. 
Kenneth Luikart blames the dissemination (communication between policymakers and 
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intelligence officials) process for the failures of the intelligence community, which is a clear 
indication of the weak relationships between the bureaucracy and policymakers. He argues that 
the intelligence community should have been reassessed after the fall of the Soviet Union, as 
Mike McConnell also pointed out, so that it could combat the new threats from non-state actors. 
He provides several suggestions for changing the intelligence community in terms of a new 
“indications and warnings cell.” Although he does not specifically define this term, he does map 
out how this would be achieved. Luikart believes that many of the intelligence failures of the 
past are a result of the breakdown of the dissemination process. His suggestions for reform 
would strengthen the dissemination process as well as other weak aspects of the intelligence 
community. One of his suggestions was for analysts to work closer with policymakers (Luikart 
2003).   
Glenn Hastedt also makes the argument that the relationships between the branches need 
to be strengthened in order for intelligence to flow effectively. This article is a response to the 
Schlesinger Report, which was a study undertaken by the Office of Management and Budget 
during Nixon’s administration and a response to Michael Warner’s evaluation of the report. The 
purpose of the report was to analyze the intelligence community because Nixon did not trust it. 
Hastedt uses a literature review to solve the question about how to change the intelligence 
community. Hastedt expands upon the suggestions of Richard Betts, Amy Zegart, and Richard 
Russell on how to change it. He argues that the relationships between Congress and the 
intelligence community and between the executive and the intelligence community need to be 
assessed. He then argues that the most common reform proposals have to do with strengthening 
managerial leadership and lines of authority (Hastedt 2009). 
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John Gentry argues that the relationship problems in the intelligence community are 
between the individual agencies. He says that turf wars within the intelligence community are the 
major issue. He argues that the Intelligence and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) failed to 
solve the problems of the intelligence community. His main argument is that adding more layers 
of bureaucracy does not solve communication problems. He suggests that agencies and 
organizations be combined or eliminated, therefore fostering more communication as a result of 
less turf wars. He also includes a section about where the executive and legislative branches went 
wrong in pre-9/11 intelligence affairs (Gentry 2008). 
In a later article, John Gentry expands upon that point and places all blame for 
intelligence failures on Congress and the President. He argues that there are issues within the 
intelligence community, but not all of them are the fault of the bureaucracy itself. Gentry 
analyzed eight case studies of counterinsurgency wars in various countries to find common 
patterns among them. Through his study, he concludes that the other branches in the federal 
government are predominately responsible for intelligence failures and that the intelligence 
community is often made the scape goat (Gentry 2010). This article does not directly refute his 
claims from his previous article. It just puts more emphasis on the relationship between the 
branches rather than the relationship between the intelligence community organizations. 
David Goldman and Stan Taylor also view layers of bureaucracy as contributing to turf 
wars, which disable the intelligence community. They question whether America still needs 
intelligence agencies, if new agencies are needed, if funding needs to be increased, if agencies 
need more personnel, and what changes need to be implemented to help the intelligence cycle in 
general. The authors argue that intelligence is still necessary because it seems that there will 
always be threats to national security, no matter how big or small. They take the common 
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viewpoint that adding more bureaucracy to the intelligence community does not solve any of the 
problems. They also refute the argument that the community needs more funding or personnel. 
Goldman and Taylor provide suggestions for how to better the intelligence community without 
adding more layers of bureaucracy. There should be better correlation between strategy and 
intelligence, more collection redundancy but less analytical redundancy, improved analysis 
through better training and recruiting methods, and collection practices should be reassessed. 
This is the first time, in my research, that anyone has addressed the redundancy issue in this way. 
They argued that multiple collection disciplines should be used on one area of interest, but 
multiple analysts should not be used to evaluate the information (Goldman and Taylor 2004). 
Additional Problems in the Intelligence Community 
Douglas Hart and Steven Simon take a completely separate approach to intelligence 
reform by arguing about the educational system and its failure to produce adequate people for the 
needs of the agencies. They contend that in order for the intelligence community to combat the 
jihadist movement, the educational system needs to be reformed. They cite a lack of emphasis on 
foreign language/culture and critical thinking as the problems with the education system. Their 
basic conclusion is that colleges and universities need to put greater emphasis on critical thinking 
and development of cultural knowledge so that the intelligence community has a better pool of 
people to recruit from (Hart and Simon 2006).  
Stephen Flynn argues that there are issues in the secrecy aspect of the intelligence 
community. He believes that if the public is made more aware of intelligence information, they 
will be able to play a role in preventing national security disasters. The major evidence he cites 
for this point is the Christmas Day Bomber incident where a street vendor detected the bomb and 
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alerted officials. Greater transparency will provoke the public to play a more active role in 
protecting the homeland (Flynn 2011). 
The most comprehensive evaluation of the mistakes of 9/11 were produced in the 9/11 
Commission report. The 9/11 Commission provided details on issues with the Transportation 
Security Agency and the flight services, as well issues within the major organizations of the 
intelligence community. The report is an overview of everything that went wrong. The 
conclusion of this report yielded the recommendations carried out by the Bush administration 
such as the institution of new agencies/positions (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
upon the United States 2004). Although this report goes over many of the problems that were 
evident that day, it does not provide the most effective recommendations for the future. Much of 
the other scholarly work that has been published recently is in response to this report and the 
legislation that was implemented based on the recommendations from it.  
Overall, the scholars and the people in the intelligence field agree that intelligence reform 
needs to be improved. According to these academics and experts, the main areas in need of 
improvement are the ODNI, the relationships between the branches of government and the 
intelligence community, the problem of turf wars, lines of communication, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency as a whole. The arguments of these scholars cover almost every aspect of 
the intelligence community. Though scholars provide great analysis of the problems, they 
generally recommend ideas that are unrealistic in practice. They have not worked in the 
intelligence community and cannot understand what changes can actually be implemented. The 
people that have worked within the intelligence community are more likely to provide realistic 
recommendations though their analysis of problems may be bias.  
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These scholars and insiders that have written on the topic of intelligence reform have had 
a tendency to be quite critical of it with the only positive opinions being about the institution of 
the NCTC. Experts on intelligence are aware that recent reform has done little to make the 
organizations work in a more effective and efficient manner. Although they make valid points 
about their limitations, the majority of them neglect to address one of the biggest issues plaguing 
the intelligence process over the last several decades.  
Though this literature critiques IRTPA for what it did implement, there are key elements 
missing from the reform legislation. These scholars have tended to focus on organizational issues 
such as stovepipes and turf wars. Although these are common problems within any organization, 
these are not the most important issues in this body of organizations. The need for multiple 
organizations within the intelligence community is the source of the turf war problem, as 
suggested by Helen Fessenden (2005). Organizations naturally compete for approval because it 
can lead to a greater allotment of the intelligence budget. The issue of stovepipes is also natural 
in the intelligence community because of the necessity for hierarchy. Michael Hayden (2010) 
advocated for hierarchy between the DNI and the DCIA, yet this relationship has seen conflict as 
a result.  One of the fundamental concepts in the intelligence community is secrecy.  If everyone 
in the intelligence community were allowed to have access to all information, there would likely 
be many more leaks and breaches of security. Both of these issues are embedded in the 
community and have the ability to be improved, but it is clear that they are not the direct cause of 
intelligence failures. 
Reform attempts have failed by focusing on surface problems rather than addressing their 
sources, and future reforms should focus on the relationship dynamic between the intelligence 
community and the policymakers it serves. The intelligence community is mostly responsible for 
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collecting and analyzing information in order to assist policymakers in their decision-making 
processes. It is the job of the policymaker to make the appropriate decisions based on the 
information they are given. It seems that on at least two major occasions a breakdown in the 
process has occurred during the dissemination step. The Vietnam War and the Iraq War are the 
two solid examples that have had major ramifications as a result of a faulty dissemination 
process.  
Joshua Rovner, a professor of Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War College, wrote a 
book on the politicization of intelligence that offers case studies of this problem. In his book, 
Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence, he covers several topics 
pertaining to the politicization issue including, the ideal relationship between policymaker and 
intelligence officials, where the breakdown in the relationship generally occurs, and examples of 
when this breakdown has led to dramatic outcomes (2011).  
Rovner suggests that the ideal relationship between policymaker and intelligence official 
is rarely achieved. The ideal relationship is one in which the intelligence community must feel 
free to work objectively and the policymakers need their intelligence to answer the right 
questions. This relationship is rarely achieved because the two positions are not naturally 
compatible. Analytical objectivity and policy relevance are seen as opposing principles, yet these 
are the two goals at work. If there is going to be an ideal relationship, however, the intelligence 
community must feel free to work objectively and the policymakers need the intelligence 
community to answer the right questions. The hope of the analysts is to be free from political 
pressure about what policy their analysis needs to support. The policymaker wants intelligence 
that is relevant and timely to the issues at hand. This dynamic means that analytical objectivity 
and policy relevance need to be at work at the same time. It is easy to see how objectivity can be 
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sacrificed if it is not meeting the needs of urgent issues that the policymaker may want to address 
(Rovner 2011, 20).  
As stated previously, the ideal relationship is rarely met. Thus, there are some common 
tensions in the relationship that do not always lead to politicization of intelligence. Some 
policymakers do not trust the intelligence community so they request the raw data themselves 
and try to interpret it. For example, President Lyndon Johnson was a fan of raw signals 
intelligence and would try to analyze it himself.  The intelligence community is against the 
bypassing of the analytical process because a lot of information is misleading without 
professional interpretation (Rovner 2011, 21).  
Rovner argues that a related issue to the policymaker’s mistrust of the intelligence 
community is his lack of interest in what is being produced. Policymakers are only in office for a 
relatively short amount of time. Their primary interest is in current intelligence rather than long-
term predictions. They have various other priorities in their agendas, and for this reason they 
favor short reports to long ones and raw data over speculation (Rovner 2011, 24). President 
Lyndon B. Johnson preferred short, informal briefings on intelligence. John McCone, the first 
DCI under Johnson was unable to provide this style of briefing so their relationship suffered. 
Richard Helms, the second DCI, was able to provide this style which led to a positive 
relationship with Johnson (Rovner 2011, 84). Short reports on current raw data are not the most 
informative or detail-oriented. The intelligence community would prefer to be able to forecast, 
give context, and provide longer reports so that they can explain each issue in depth. If the 
policymaker is not interested in the intelligence official’s report, there is not much else that can 
15 
 
be done. Therefore, intelligence officials generally tailor their reports to fit the desires of the 
policymaker, whether that is the most effective option or not (Rovner 2011, 24).  
According to Rovner, another issue that causes friction in the relationship is the need for 
secrecy. The intelligence community has two incentives for guarding their secrets from 
policymakers: professional and bureaucratic. On the professional end, intelligence officials do 
not want to reveal the sources and methods they used to obtain the information for fear that those 
sources may be leaked and therefore jeopardized. On the bureaucratic end, each intelligence 
agency wants to show how valuable it is, so guarding secrets allows it to have an advantage over 
other agencies. This issue relates to the problem of turf wars, also addressed by Helen Fessenden 
(2005), where agencies want a greater portion of the intelligence budget, so they compete with 
each other instead of helping each other out. The friction between the two positions is inevitable, 
but it does not have to lead to unethical actions (Rovner 2011, 22).  
Rovner describes the breakdowns that can occur in the policymaker-intelligence official 
relationship that surpass the acceptable “bounds of friction” (Rovner 2011, 25). The three main 
types are excessive harmony, neglect, and politicization. Excessive harmony is when the 
policymaker and intelligence official are too close. This leads to the policymaker’s willingness to 
accept the intelligence official’s reports as doctrine. They have too much confidence in the 
results. The intelligence official is also more likely to have “tunnel vision” where they are only 
looking at the issues that relate to the policymaker’s wishes. Rovner uses the example of the Bay 
of Pigs operation. President John F. Kennedy was skeptical about the operation, but DCI Allen 
Dulles urged him to accept the intelligence based on the success of similar operations from the 
past (Rovner 2011, 25).  
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Neglect is the second breakdown in the relationship. This occurs when policymakers 
refuse to acknowledge or act upon the intelligence they are given. It is one of the mechanisms a 
policymaker can use when they flat out disagree with the intelligence. Policymakers are rational 
human beings, and therefore have a capacity for self-interest and bias towards their own 
predispositions. Elections are one of the factors in whether a policymaker will neglect 
unfavorable intelligence or not. They would not want the public to view them unfavorably if they 
are seeking reelection, so they would not want there to be any negative perception of their 
foreign policy or national security strategy. Policymakers have a natural bias towards their own 
predispositions, which can deter them from wanting to accept intelligence as valid if it goes 
against their own thoughts (Rovner 2011, 26).  
The third breakdown in the relationship is the politicization of intelligence. This element 
can go both ways in the relationship. The intelligence community can politicize their intelligence 
in order to influence favorable policy outcomes or they can provide favorable intelligence to be 
able to have greater access to the policymaker in the future. The policymaker can politicize 
intelligence in order to use it to support policies he is trying to pursue. Although both sides can 
politicize intelligence, the policymaker plays a greater role because he actually has the authority 
to make and change policy as a result (Rovner 2011, 29).  
Within this breakdown are multiple types of politicization. First, there is direct 
manipulation where policymakers pressure agencies to deliver specific findings. Policymakers 
often manipulate intelligence by appointing people who have the same views and are loyal to the 
administration. Once they are appointed, these people can influence what the intelligence 
community produces. Second, there is indirect manipulation. This occurs when policymakers 
reject intelligence products until they find the answer that supports their policy intentions. This 
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can also be conducted by asking the intelligence community questions that are worded in a 
specific way to yield a specific type of answer. The third type of politicization occurs on behalf 
of the intelligence community. It is when intelligence agencies submit estimates specifically 
designed to undermine policy decisions. These three types of politicization can lead to drastically 
inaccurate intelligence reports and thus to unjustified policy actions (Rovner 2011, 30-33).  
Rovner uses several examples to illustrate the breakdown in the relationship throughout 
the last century. The two examples I would like to focus on are the Johnson administration and 
the Vietnam War, as well as the more recent example of the second Bush administration and the 
Iraq War. Both of these examples show how poor policymaker/intelligence community 
relationships can lead to negative consequences, worst of all being the loss of American lives 
over wars that may not have been justified to begin with (Rovner 2011). 
Other scholars, including Paul Pillar whose work was referenced earlier and Michael 
Warner who is a historian for the Department of Defense, have acknowledged the flaws of the 
intelligence community/policymaker relationship during the Vietnam era. Paul Pillar argued that 
the administration placed more weight on its own perceptions and agenda than on the raw data 
on the war. He also notes that the intelligence was there and that it was solid enough to base a 
decision against conflict on, yet the administration ignored it. Lastly, he argues that once the war 
had begun, the administration pressured the intelligence community to produce casualty 
estimates that would support the cause (Pillar 2012). Warner argues that the initial politicization 
occurred in the way that the administration was seeking information. They requested intelligence 
that supported their current strategy rather than asking for objective intelligence. He also 
acknowledges the politicization that occurred between the military and intelligence community 
over the casualty numbers which will be addressed in detail later (Warner 2010).  
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Lyndon B. Johnson took the office of the Presidency upon the assassination of John F. 
Kennedy. Shortly thereafter, Johnson was faced with a dilemma about how to further the U.S.’s 
containment policy. It was evident that communism had spread to Vietnam and some perceived 
this as a threat to American power in East Asia.  The Johnson administration and its supporters 
used the “domino theory” to explain why the United States had to prevent Vietnam from being 
consumed by communism. The “domino theory” said that if Vietnam succumbed to communism, 
other states in that region would fall to it as well. This theory would suggest that the containment 
policy would be at risk if these events did occur. In 1964, President Johnson requested a report 
by the Board of National Estimates on this theory. The Board came back with two reports. The 
first report said that the domino theory was incorrect and that the U.S. position in Asia did not 
depend on the defense of South Vietnam. The second report said that the U.S. had no pressing 
interest in Vietnam and little chance of success. Both of these reports were ignored by President 
Johnson (Rovner 2011, 49-50). He neglected these reports as a form of politicization. Johnson 
was able to neglect them rather than influence them because the public was not interested in the 
policy strategy for Vietnam at that time. He did not need to use the reports to support his agenda 
because he had not made a definite decision on the U.S. strategy and the public did not care 
(Rovner 2011, 87-88).  
The second time a form of politicization occurred in this administration was in 1967. The 
country was already at war at this point and the administration was on a public relations 
campaign to win over those in opposition. The U.S. strategy in Vietnam was to kill or capture 
more Viet Cong soldiers than could be replenished. This would eventually weaken them to the 
point of surrender. In order for this strategy to work, there had to be a crossover point where 
more Viet Cong were being killed than sent. President Johnson requested a report on the Order 
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of Battle. The Order of Battle would show how many current militants there were. The Military 
Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), the joint command in charge of military operations in 
South Vietnam, produced an Order of Battle with favorable numbers. The CIA, however, 
produced an Order of Battle with completely contradictory numbers that were not favorable to 
Johnson’s policy on the war. The CIA Order of Battle suggested that enemy strength was double 
what the MACV report concluded. The administration pressured the CIA and MACV to meet in 
order to sort out the discrepancies. The CIA and MACV argued over who to count as the Viet 
Cong forces, and in the end, DCI Richard Helms was pressured into accepting the MACV 
numbers. Johnson used the MACV numbers to show the public that the crossover strategy was 
effective. He also began requesting only good news from the field and reports on what the U.S. 
had accomplished in Vietnam (Rovner 2011, 66-70).  
Both of these examples show how domestic politics can lead to the politicization of 
intelligence. The reason Johnson neglected the 1964 reports was because his administration had 
not committed to a strategy for Vietnam and the public was not very aware of what was going 
on. He did not have to use the intelligence to justify any action because no action had taken place 
at that point. Yet, he did not want that information to be made public during his presidential 
campaign and as an unelected president he did not think the public would respond well to him 
sending the country into war. In 1967, he needed the intelligence to support his strategy in order 
to win over the public who were generally in opposition to the war. He had to make sure 
intelligence was consistent with his policies and therefore had to influence what was being 
produced. Both circumstances show that the relationship was damaged because the intelligence 




Though scholars have argued that there were problems outside of the 
policymaker/intelligence community relationship during the Vietnam era, this issue has 
superseded them. The major problems that scholars and insiders have discussed in regard to 
intelligence reform are the relationships between the organizations within the intelligence 
community, the flaws of those individual organizations, and the lack of power vested in the head 
of the community. These issues have varied over time and have actually been addressed in 
reform legislation. The issue of the policymaker/intelligence community relationship is the 
primary common thread between the Vietnam War and the Iraq War.  
The Iraq War is the second major case of politicization of intelligence in the United 
States. Since the 1990s, it had been U.S. policy that Iraq needed to undergo a regime change. The 
9/11 attacks created a new feeling in the country about the threat from states and non-state actors 
in the Middle East. The Bush administration played upon this fear in the public to try to justify a 
war with Iraq. President Bush’s famous speech on the axis of evil included Iraq as a serious 
threat to U.S. national security. In the aftermath of the war and the end of that administration, it 
has become clear that the intelligence community was manipulated into supporting a war that 
may not have been justified (Rovner 2011, 137). 
According to Rovner, the integrity of the intelligence products was jeopardized in four 
ways. First, policymakers attempted to manipulate intelligence directly. Second, the 
politicization of intelligence was in response to the public’s opposition to the war. Third, 
policymakers used the distorted intelligence to support their policy decisions by playing on the 
secrecy aspect. Fourth, this politicization prevented any organization from truly reassessing the 
estimates. The Bush administration made a strong commitment to a controversial policy and it 
was met by public opposition. They needed to win the support of the American people and the 
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Democratic Senate, so they chose to politicize intelligence to support their policy decisions 
(Rovner 2011, 139).  
The relationship between the Bush administration and the intelligence community went 
through three phases. The first phase occurred before 9/11. The intelligence products were 
cautious estimates about Iraq’s capabilities and intentions and were not based on solid evidence. 
The Bush administration chose to ignore these products, which is understandable because they 
were not substantiated claims. The intelligence community, however, did warn the 
administration on the threat of Al Qaeda, yet Bush thought it was just a ploy to “cover their 
asses” (Rovner 2011, 146). The second phase was the year following 9/11. Policymakers asked 
the intelligence community to find links between Iraq and terrorist groups, specifically Al Qaeda. 
The intelligence community came back with inconclusive results, which were also ignored by the 
Bush administration. The final phase occurred after the summer of 2002. The White House 
began to pressure the intelligence community to join the policy consensus on the need for 
military action (Rovner 2011, 142-144).  
Despite the lack of evidence from the intelligence community, a big part of the 
administration believed that Saddam Hussein was involved in both World Trade Center attacks. 
When the intelligence community was unable to prove this, the administration turned to the 
Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) which was an ad hoc organization 
designed to give the administration what they wanted. The PCTEG began using information 
from Iraqi exiles who sought revenge against the regime to show links between Saddam and 
terrorist organizations. Though this information was not used as intelligence, it was a big 
component of the public relations campaign (Rovner 2011, 146).  
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The administration still needed the support of the intelligence community, so it used other 
indirect politicization tactics to pressure them. The administration repeated the same questions to 
the intelligence community over and over as if to suggest they were not getting the answers they 
wanted. Vice President Cheney began to make regular visits to the CIA, where his presence 
made analysts feel uncomfortable and pressured (Rovner 2011, 149).  
Direct politicization occurred when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice urged DCI 
George Tenet to show his support for the President. He obliged and contacted The New York 
Times pledging that the intelligence was consistent with the President’s plan. Furthermore, Tenet 
later admitted that he declassified intelligence that would make the administration’s public 
statements more convincing (Rovner 2011, 153).  
The indirect and direct politicization led to the publishing of a declassified white paper 
based on a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) by the CIA. The white paper was missing 
caveats and qualifying phrases and suggested that the information was conclusive. This was used 
by the administration in their public campaign. A major issue with the NIE itself was that it was 
requested by the Senate Intelligence Committee shortly prior to their vote on military action in 
Iraq. In general, NIEs take about six months to produce; this one took three weeks. The 
drastically shortened period of time did not allow for proper collection and analytical work to be 
conducted (Rovner 2011, 158).  
The key judgments portion of the Iraq WMD NIE, the only part that has been declassified 
so far, has many flaws. There were several judgments made based on the absence of evidence. 
The CIA used the concepts of denial and deception to allude to the presence of more information 
rather than the lack of information. For example, they state, “We judge that we are seeing only a 
portion of Iraq’s WMD efforts, owing to Baghdad’s vigorous denial and deception efforts” (CIA 
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2002, 5) While it could be true that Iraq was able to hide their WMD efforts, it is also a huge 
possibility that they were not pursuing WMDs and that is why there was no evidence to support 
the claim that they were. The CIA uses the deception concept again when addressing the 
expansion of Iraq’s chemical and biological infrastructure by saying that it is under the cover of 
civilian production. Once again, they could have been using the materials to produce civilian 
goods. Many of the materials that Iraq sought had dual uses and were not necessarily for the 
production of WMDs (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 2004, 180). The NIE also states 
that Iraq had a development program for an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). They speculate 
that the UAV would be used to deliver biological warfare agents. The purpose of a UAV is not 
necessarily to deliver weapons. Many are used for reconnaissance and the Air Force as well as a 
few other agencies believed that that was the purpose of this one. The report makes note of Iraq’s 
acquisition of high-strength aluminum tubes for the purpose of uranium enrichment to pursue 
nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy and the State Department’s Intelligence and 
Research bureau both disagreed with this point. They argued that the tubes were not of the 
appropriate quality for nuclear weapons production and were more likely to be used for artillery 
rockets (CIA 2002, 6-9). The way the NIE was constructed with the misleading judgments and 
even the use of bolded words, help support the point that the administration was seeking to 
prove. There are some opinions that suggest otherwise listed within the NIE but it was not made 
public until July 2003, which was four months after the U.S. invasion of Iraq.  
Additionally, the NIE’s conclusions were heavily based on information provided by a 
human asset referred to as “CURVEBALL”. CURVEBALL was an Iraqi defector who worked 
as a chemical engineer in the regime prior to 1999. The German Intelligence Service (BND) had 
him in their custody and refused to allow the US direct to access him. The inability of the US 
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intelligence agencies to interrogate him on their own should have raised flags about the 
credibility of his statements. Furthermore, there was a lot of evidence that he had a drinking 
problem which should have also jeopardized his credibility (Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence 2004, 154). In the aftermath of this debacle, it has been reported that the allegations 
CURVEBALL made about the Iraq WMD program were false (Pidd 2011).  If the intelligence 
community had been executing better analytical work, they would have made note of the lack of 
credible human intelligence on the WMD program.  
The administration used the NIE-based white paper to downplay dissent among analysts, 
exaggerate uncertainty of future events, exploit the element of secrecy, and argue that policy 
options were self-evident. The problem with the secrecy of intelligence is that the public is 
unaware of the information that is classified because they do not possess appropriate security 
clearances. The government will share one part of an intelligence report to invoke the perception 
they want from the public and then warn them that the classified information further supports 
their cause. When they are trying to invoke fear in the aftermath of 9/11, warning the public that 
the content in the classified intelligence is threatening to national security has a profound effect 
on their perception of danger (Rovner 2011, 177-179).  
According to Rovner, there was intelligence on Iraq’s capabilities and intentions, but the 
intelligence community had to ignore it in order to meet the wishes of the administration (2011). 
Iraq’s Foreign Minister, Naji Sabri, was recruited by France and acknowledged that Iraq had no 
operational biological weapons facilities, that it would take them at least 18-24 months to build a 
nuclear warhead, and that the regime had no relationship with Al Qaeda. Although his statements 
needed to be corroborated, they are a good base of evidence and would refute some of the claims 
made by the administration (Rovner 2011, 183). The intelligence community also made a huge 
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mistake when they implied that information gaps were the result of Iraqi concealment and 
deception. The information gaps were actually gaps of information, where they had not collected 
or analyzed information. If this point was acknowledged, it would show how inconclusive their 
findings truly were (Rovner 2011, 181).  
The Bush administration’s relationship with the intelligence community mirrored that of 
the Johnson administration. They both ignored intelligence reports when the public was not 
interested in the policy strategy and then politicized it when they needed the information to 
support their plan. These two situations show that factors such as political party, intelligence 
reform legislation, and world order have no bearing on how heavily intelligence can be 
politicized (Rovner 2011).  
Unfortunately, this problem was not addressed in the post 9/11 reform legislation. On 
September 11, 2012 another terrorist attack occurred against Americans. The U.S. Diplomatic 
Mission in Benghazi, Libya suffered an attack on the anniversary of the worst terrorist attacks to 
happen to the United States. During the attack, four Americans were killed including U.S. 
Ambassador to Libya, Christopher Stevens. On this same day in Egypt, protests ignited in 
response to an anti-Islam video that was produced in America. The Obama administration 
attributed the attacks on the consulate to the protests over the video. Nearly, three months have 
passed since this incident and it has become evident that the Benghazi attack had no relation to 
the video and that it was a pre-planned terrorist attack. Uncovered emails have shown that the 
administration and many other government agencies were made aware that it was a terrorist 
attack only two hours after it began, yet the administration continued with the video story until 
intelligence officials publicly said otherwise. This prompted people to question the 
administration’s role in the attacks (Hosenball 2012).  
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There have been numerous reports exposing the mistakes made by officials within the 
administration. First of all, there had been several requests for more security in Benghazi, yet 
those requests were ignored. Secondly, Ambassador Stevens sent cables back to the State 
Department explaining the growing threat in Libya as a result of the increasing influence of 
terrorist groups in the area (Lee 2012). The change in threat level should have alerted the State 
Department to the absolute need for more resources to protect the consulate. Thirdly, when the 
attack began, President Obama claims that he issued a directive to secure the personnel. Though 
he may have actually issued the directive, it did not go through the chain of command because 
forces were not deployed (Bennett 2012).  
This incident is still new and much of the information has not been released yet. It would 
seem that some part of the administration had a role in politicizing intelligence by neglecting the 
reports that they were receiving. The state department was made aware of the growing threat and 
the need for more resources, yet they ignored it. Eric Nordstrom, one of the witnesses in the 
Hearing on Security Failures in Benghazi, noted that he requested additional resources to protect 
the consulate in Libya but Charlene Lamb, senior State Department official, told him to stop 
making such requests because “there would be too much political cost” (McGreal 2012). This 
example shows that at least on this level, government officials were neglecting intelligence 
because of the effect it would have on domestic politics. The Benghazi attacks occurred close to 
the 2012 Presidential Election and could have jeopardized President Obama’s reelection efforts. 
It seems that the administration was trying to protect President’s Obama’s reputation throughout 
this process. The malfeasances that occurred in this situation have not been directly tied to 
President Obama, but the information that has yet to be released could show that he may have 
also played a role. Even so, a big part of the administration, the State Department, was partially 
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responsible for this attack and the cover up that followed. Furthermore, former CIA director 
David Petraeus testified at the Hearing that he was aware of the terrorist involvement in the 
attack from the beginning. He also said that the Al-Qaeda affiliated group’s involvement in the 
attack was originally on the document of talking points but before being declassified, it was 
taken off (Cornwell and Zakaria 2012). The party that removed that point is still unknown, but 
this shows that somewhere in the federal government the document was altered to prevent the 
public from knowing the truth about the attack.  Politicization of intelligence is suspected in this 
case, which if proven, would show that even after IRTPA was implemented, the problems 
between the intelligence community and the policymaker still exist.  
Although Rovner (2011) argues about the importance of the relationship between the 
policymaker and the intelligence official, he does not go as far as to say it is the most important 
issue plaguing the intelligence community today. Yet, it is the primary common thread between 
the two massive intelligence failures and is a likely cause of the third intelligence failure. There 
have been several attempts at reforming the intelligence community in the wake of tragedies. As 
mentioned earlier, they range from creating new organizations to changing the way students are 
educated.  Creating new organizations and thereby adding layers of bureaucracy has actually 
added problems to the intelligence community by fostering an increase in turf wars. 
Organizations are still competing with each other to obtain the biggest portion of the budget 
(Goldman and Taylor 2004). Many scholars have argued that the DNI needs to be strengthened. 
While this is true, it is not the primary concern. He will still have the problem of not being able 
to oversee the tasks of each organization in the intelligence community. Because the position is 
new and the community is rooted in tradition, it will probably take several years for him to have 
the authority and prestige he needs to operate successfully (Tucker 2008). Other issues such as 
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the recruitment and training process for people in the intelligence community are not necessarily 
fixed through legislative reform. Each organization should be responsible for hiring the most 
diverse people and training them accordingly so that they can collect and analyze intelligence in 
the most effective way.  
This issue of the relationship between policymaker and the intelligence community is the 
most important because this is where policy actually comes into play. The communication 
between the two has to be solid and sincere for appropriate policies to be implemented based on 
objective intelligence products. The breakdown in the relationship can only lead to poor 
consequences. The function of the intelligence community is to produce objective products and 
the function of the policymaker is to implement policies based on those products. If both are 
doing their jobs correctly, the government will be doing its best to protect U.S. national security.  
Conclusion 
This research study is essential because national security is the top priority of the United 
States. If the intelligence community is incapable of protecting the homeland from future 
terrorist attacks, Americans will be in grave danger. This research shows how the government 
has attempted to reform the intelligence community on numerous accounts since its 
establishment as a permanent institution, yet has failed to see that it might actually be a part of 
the problem. 
Other scholars have criticized intelligence reform in various ways, including the 
policymaker-intelligence official relationship, yet none have come to the conclusion that this 
problem is the most significant of all. A primary focus on this problem is essential to lasting 
reforms. Once this problem can be addressed, other reforms will have greater impact on the 
functionality of the institution.  
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To further this research, scholars and experts should look for possible solutions to the 
problem. My research has been focused on acknowledging and assessing the problem, but not 
necessarily solving it. I have a couple suggestions for fixing this issue, but they need to be 
further researched. For example, it may be advantageous to get rid of the DNI position and return 
the DCI as the head of the intelligence community. According to my calculations, the average 
term for a DCI is about three and a half years whereas the average term for a DNI is less than 
two. I think this statistic could show that the DCI was a better position to have longevity in than 
the DNI is. It is important that the head of the intelligence community holds the position for 
several years so that they have enough time to build a relationship with the President. There are 
limitations to this suggestion because the frequent change in DNI could be due to that fact that it 
is still in the early stages and the kinks need to be sorted out. If it appears that that is not the case, 
the federal government should consider returning to the pre-IRTPA status quo.  
Additionally, there could be a congressional committee established to oversee the 
relationship between the intelligence official and the President. This committee would have to 
monitor the intelligence provided by the community and the President’s response to it. The 
committee would be able to make sure that politicization does not occur because the 
dissemination process would become somewhat transparent.  
Other than solutions, scholars should also look into the role of the other people in an 
administration related to this issue. Secretaries of State and Vice Presidents are heavily involved 
in intelligence decisions, and the politicization of those decisions, as well. It would be helpful to 
analyze how their predispositions or policy goals affect the way a President acts towards the 
intelligence community. Furthermore, research on the Libya case should be extended. As I am 
conducting my research in the beginning of the investigation there is likely much more 
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information to be discovered. This case should be able to show that even post 9/11 reform 
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